Previous research has suggested that communication and especially promises increase cooperation in laboratory experiments. This has been taken as evidence for internal motivations such as guilt aversion or preference for promise keeping. The goals of this paper are to examine messages under a double-blind payoff procedure to test the alternative explanation that promise keeping is due to external influence and outside-the-lab reputational concerns and to assess how the impact of communication varies with social distance. Employing a 2x2 design, we find no evidence that communication increases the overall level of cooperation in our experiments with double-blind payoff procedures. However, we also find no evidence that communication impacts cooperation in our experiments with single-blind payoff procedures. Further, the payoff procedure does not appear to impact aggregate cooperation.
subject kept his or her word and 2. to assess how social distance affects the effectiveness of communication. In order to tackle these two questions we implemented a 2x2 design varying the social distance (single-blind vs. double-blind) and the opportunity to send hand written messages. Behavioural theories such as guilt aversion, lie aversion, honesty and preference for promise keeping predict no difference in communication effects on cooperation under singleblind and double-blind procedures since they all rely on internal motivation, making the presence of a third party irrelevant. These models would predict that switching to a double-blind payoff procedure will lead to similar change in cooperation with and without messages. It is also possible that promises are able to overcome the cooperation destroying tendencies of double-blind payoff procedures, making the impact of messages even more important. However, if people are mainly motivated by outside-the-lab reputational concerns, aversion to shame and/or other external influences, then observability by a bystander might have profound implications on their behaviour and on communication itself.
We did not observe any impact of messages in our double-blind experiments. However, to our surprise we also did not find any impact of messages in our single-blind experiments. That is, we fail to replicate CD's finding. Further, we do not find any evidence that the payoff procedures affect behaviour with or without messages. Our findings are driven by the fact that we observe a high level of cooperation without messages. In fact the level of cooperation we observe using double-blind procedures is similar to what is reported in CD with messages. Our results demonstrate two important points. The first is topic specific: the effects of decreasing social distance and allowing communication are relative and not absolute. In our case, cooperation was quite high in the absence of these two factors leaving little room for incremental improvement in cooperation. The second point is more general: it is important to conduct widespread replication of experimental results and non-results. Had our study been conducted first, the conclusion that would have been drawn was that cheap talk communication had no impact, consistent with standard economic theory. Such a finding likely would have stunted the growth in this literature. The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we describe our experimental procedures. Section 3 presents our results and compares them to other related studies. The final section offers concluding remarks.
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES.
CD introduce a simple one-shot hidden action trust game. In this game Player A can choose Out yielding both players $5. Alternatively, A can choose In, in which case Player B determines both players' payoffs. If B chooses Don't Roll then A earns $0 and B earns $14. If B chooses Roll then B earns $10 and A earns $0 if a die roll ends up on 1 and earns $12 otherwise. The payoff structure is shown in Table 1 . Critically, both players know that a selfish action by B is never directly revealed to A. Thus, A cannot determine if a $0 payoff is due to B's selfish act or bad luck. We set out to explore whether people keep promises due to external concerns, stemming from the fact that the experimenters themselves observed both the messages that were sent and the actions that were actually taken. In order to thoroughly assess the impact of messages under the two different payoff protocols, we conducted double-blind conditions with and without messages as well as a replication of CD's single-blind ones.
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We implement a double-blind payoff procedure similar to that in Hoffman et al. (1994) . As subjects entered the lab, they drew slips indicating if they were in the A role (player 1) or B role (player 2). Bs sat in the back half of the lab and As sat in the front half of the lab. Each person was seated at individual workstation with privacy dividers. Instructions were then handed out and all questions were answered publicly. Then a large curtain was partially drawn so that everyone could verify the procedures while visually separating the two types. Identical envelopes with coded mailbox keys and coded response forms were placed in a large box and taken around the B half of the lab. Subjects drew out a single envelope, but waited to open it until the experimenters had returned to the A side. B subjects made their decisions, placed the mailbox key in their pocket, and returned the response form into the envelope. After Bs finished, they dropped their envelopes back into the large box. The envelopes were then shuffled and opened in the gap between the two areas. Messages were cut off from the B forms, and stapled to coded response forms for As. The forms were then placed in envelopes along with a coded mailbox key. As then selected an envelope from a box and waited for the experimenters to return to the B side before opening the envelopes, placing the keys into their pockets, making their decisions, and returning the forms into the envelopes. When everyone was done, the experimenters determined the payoffs for each player 5 , placed the money in plain envelopes, and placed the envelopes in the coded mailboxes in another room in the lab. Subjects privately opened their mailboxes, collected their earnings envelopes, and left the lab. As argued by Barmettler, et al. (2012) , previous comparisons between single-blind and double-blind procedures tend to emphasize the payoff procedures in double-blind, but not single-blind. This asymmetry may create a demand effect for the subjects and encourage people to act more selfishly in double-blind experiments (see Zizzo, 2010 for a discussion of experimenter demand effects). Therefore, we are careful to keep the attention paid to the payoff procedures similar between our single-blind and double-blind experiments (see the instructions in Appendix 1 for details).
A total of 292 undergraduate students participated in this between subjects study at the Behavioural Business Research Laboratories at the University of Arkansas. Participants received a $5 participation payment in addition to their salient earning from the approximately 20 minute study, which was slightly under $8.00 on average.
BEHAVIOURAL RESULTS.
We present the results in two subsections. The first looks at the primary treatment effects and compares observed behaviour to what has been reported previously in the literature. The second looks at the content of the handwritten notes to distinguish the impact of promises from other types of messages.
TREATMENT EFFECTS AND COMPARISON TO LITERATURE.
The first two rows of Table 2 compare behaviour between our four conditions. The percentage of As who choose In is similar in the double-blind conditions (64% in the message condition and 60% in the no message condition, p-value = 0.689, two-sample proportion test). The striking feature is that the percentage of Bs who choose Roll is also indistinguishable between two double-blind conditions: 68% versus 67% (p-value = 0.877). These results suggest that messages do not impact behaviour with a double-blind protocol.
Based on the data from our experiments presented in the second row of Table 3 , we find no evidence that messages affect behaviour using a single-blind procedure for players in either role (p-values = 0.942 and 0.894 for As and Bs, respectively). That is, we do not replicate the effectiveness of messages reported in CD, which is shown in the third row of Table 2 . However, the effectiveness of messages at encouraging cooperation in this type of environment has also been found by Vanberg (2008) and Goeree and Zhang (2012) , whose results are presented in the fourth and fifth rows of To determine the impact of the payoff procedures, we compare the data in the first two rows of Table 2 . The behaviour observed under the single-blind payoff procedure is similar to that which we observed in the double-blind procedure (p-values = 0.300 for As messages, 0.220 for As without messages, 0.732 for Bs with messages, and 0.726 for Bs without messages. Based upon these results we do not find any effect of social distance on cooperation whether communication is possible or not. Why do we draw different conclusions from those of previous studies? The answer can be surmised from casual inspection of the columns in Table 2 . Without messages, the rate at which As choose In is between two-thirds and three-fourths. This, coincidentally, is the same rate at which Bs choose Roll with messages across all of the studies. Where the results differ is in the No Message conditions. Here we continue to observe high levels of cooperation, but the others studies see a large decline in cooperation. Specifically, the rate at which the other studies observe As choosing In is approximately fifty percent without messages. The rate at which Bs choose Roll falls to between a third and a half without messages for the other studies. Combing the data from our treatments and comparing it with combined data from the CD, Vanberg, and Goeree and Zhang studies we find that the behaviour does not differ with messages (p-value = 0.933 for As and 0.527 for Bs), but does differ without messages (p-value = 0.085 for As and 0.004 for Bs).
Why are the messages in our experiment ineffective? The explanation that we favor is that the incremental effects on cooperation of things like messages and observability are decreasing in the overall level of cooperation. That is, the level of trustworthiness that we observe in the double-blind No Message condition may already be so high (67%), that there is not much room for messages or single-blind payoff procedures to increase it. Why we observe as much cooperation in our double-blind No Message condition as CD in their single-blind message condition is an open question. One possible explanation is subject pool differences. We have at least some evidence of such differences based upon the messages that are sent; we find relatively fewer subjects actually sending messages in our study.
7 However, previous experiments conducted using our subject pool have not generated overly cooperative behaviour in the past (see Deck 2009 Deck , 2010 . Another possibility is that some aspect of our implementation led to more cooperative behaviour (or some aspect of theirs led to less cooperative behaviour). However, as we described in the previous section, we tried to closely follow CD's instructions and procedures. Replication is never perfect as the lab facility, appearance of the experimenters, time of day, and countless other factors differ between studies. What we as researchers want to know if how robust a phenomenon is to such nuisance variables. Several other papers have found that communication is effective at increasing cooperation (see Beck et al., 2010; Ben-Ner et al., 2011; Bochet and Putterman, 2009; Servátka et al., 2011 to name a few). Our results suggest that the impact of communication may not be as robust as the literature suggests, especially if there is a bias against "non-results" being published.
8 This is not meant to suggest that communication is not effective. Indeed, if one combines all of the data across studies in Table  2 , one would still find that messages lead to a greater percentage of As choosing In (p-value = 0.094) and a greater percentage of Bs choosing to Roll (p-value = 0.001). 9 We do however see one of our paper's contributions as a reminder that human behaviour is less predictable and more nuanced than phenomena studied in chemistry or physics experiments, something that is easy to lose sight of. We also see our paper as a reminder that it is important to replicate both results and non-results. Had CD's original results looked like ours, there likely would not be the large literature that built upon their work, which would be a shame.
THE IMPACT OF MESSAGE TYPE ON BEHAVIOUR.
Up to this point, we have focused on the aggregate effect of B having the opportunity to send a message to A. We now turn to the specific content of the messages, which are shown in Appendix 2 for both our double-blind and single-blind conditions. To evaluate each we employed three coders to rate each message as being a promise, a non-promise message, or blank. 10 The coders received the instructions for our double-blind conditions, instructions on the coding procedure, and a typed transcript of the messages. Coders went through each message individually and were paid $20 for the task. Our coders also went through the relevant messages from CD. This allows us to make a direct comparison about the effectiveness of messages in the three cases without introducing variation due to the way coders interpret messages. While our coders generally agreed with the evaluations in CD there were some differences, as indicated in Appendix 2. In the remainder of the paper, all references to message types are based upon the opinions of our coders and we restrict attention to cases where our coders had unanimous agreement. Table 3 evaluates behaviour conditional on message type across the three message conditions. The results in Table 3 reveal several interesting patterns. First, according to the classification by our coders there is no evidence that subjects who make promises are more likely to choose Roll as compared to those who send non-promise messages (74% versus 56%, p-value = 0.314) or do not send messages at all (74% versus 75%, p-value = 0.963) in the CD data. Our single-blind replication finds the same pattern, albeit with small sample sizes (57% versus 60%, p-value = 0.921 and 57% versus 50%, p-value = 0.772, respectively). While in the 8 In a separate paper Charness and Dufwenberg (2010) themselves report that the effect of messages may not be that robust as they fail to replicate their previous results when only certain predetermined messages are permissible. 9 The test was performed including Ellingsen et al. No Message double-blind data. Without their data, the p-values are 0.064 and <0.001 for As and Bs, respectively. 10 Houser and Xiao (2011) point out that the researcher coding in CD is potentially problematic and employ a coordination game to evaluate subjects' messages. While Houser and Xiao's method has its advantages, previous literature on communication uses third party coders to analyze content (see for example Neuendorf, 2002) .
double-blind condition we do find that a promise increases the likelihood that B will play cooperatively as compared to a blank message (90% versus 45%, p-value = 0.026), the effect holds for non-promise messages relative to blank messages as well (83% versus 45%, p-value = 0.033) and there is no difference in behaviour based upon whether the message is a promise or not (90% versus 83%, p-value = 0.719). Note: We exclude observations for which the three coders did not agree. Assigning the observed behaviour according to the majority opinion of the message type does not substantially change the results. In subject pairs in which one of the players did not make a move, the player who did act is included in this analysis as long as the message was unambiguous to the coders.
What we do find is that As believe that Bs will keep their promises. In all three cases the percentage of As choosing In is greatest after receiving a promise and is statistically different from when no message is received (80% versus 45%, p-value = 0.068 in our double-blind condition; 100% versus 50%, p-value = 0.019 in our single-blind condition; 87% versus 25%, pvalue = 0.006 in CD). However, non-promise messages are not viewed differently than promises in any of the three cases (80% versus 75%, p-value = 0.781 in our double-blind condition; 100% versus 80%, p-value = 0.188 in our single-blind condition; 87% versus 67%, pvalue = 0.186 in CD).
By and large, our data is similar to CD in that messages lead As to trust and Bs often respond by being trustworthy. In fact, no pairwise comparison of A or B behaviour conditional on message type between any two of the three data sets shown in Table 3 is statistically  significant. 11 However, there appears to be a substantial difference in the types of messages that are sent between our experiments and those of CD. In both our single-blind and our double-blind conditions, the modal message type was blank whereas the modal message type in CD was a promise. A test rejects the null hypothesis that the distribution of message types is the same in the three cases ( 2 [4 d.f.] = 16.727, p-value = 0.002). Inspection of the messages (see Appendix 2) also suggests that messages tended to be longer in CD than in our study. In fact, the average number of words in CD was 30.4 and in our single-blind replication it was only 8.8 (a statistically significant difference: t-statistic = 4.16, p-value < 0.001). Therefore, it seems that the difference in aggregate behaviour discussed in section 4.2 may be driven in part by differences in the willingness of Bs to send a message.
CONCLUSIONS.
The experiments in this paper were designed to test whether the positive impact that messages have on cooperation are driven by internal motivations or whether they are the result of external social forces. To explore this we employed a 2x2 design varying the payoff procedures and the opportunity for communication in the hidden action trust game of Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) . We found no effect of communication or payoff procedure on trusting or trustworthy behaviour in aggregate. While we do find that pairs in which messages are sent had greater cooperation, consistent with previous research, we observe relatively few messages being sent. Our inability to replicate the cooperation-enhancing effect of the opportunity to send handwritten messages suggests that this behaviour may not be as robust as it has been perceived although two other studies have replicated the results. The lack of an effect from the payoff procedures in our data and in Barmettler et al. (2012) , when giving both methods comparable emphasis, is counter to received wisdom. Both of our findings suggest that more research is needed to better understand the subtlety of human behaviour. One possible explanation, consistent with previous studies along both dimensions, is that the incremental effect of cooperation-improving mechanism is decreasing in the underlying level of cooperation. That is, if cooperation is already high (due perhaps to experimental procedures or subject pool effects) then communication and single-blind payoff procedures do not have as great of an effect as when the underlying cooperation rate is low. Only more evidence will ultimately distinguish between explanations such as this for variations across studies and type-1 or type-2 statistical errors due to inherent variance among people. By the same token, our findings also demonstrate the need to publish and replicate non-results. Had early work on communication or payoff procedures mirrored what we observed, both streams of literatures would have likely died on the vine, creating a very different picture of cooperative behaviour.
APPENDIX 1 Subject Instructions.

The base instructions for the double-blind No Message condition. Text in --( )-and --[ ]--
highlight changes made for conditions with messages and single-blind conditions, respectively.
INSTRUCTIONS
Thank you for participating in this session. The purpose of this experiment is to study how people make decisions in a particular situation. Feel free to ask us questions as they arise, by raising your hand. Please do not speak to other participants during the experiment.
You will receive $5 for participating in this session. You may also receive additional money, depending on the decisions made (as described below). Upon completion of the session, this additional amount will be paid to you (as described below).
During the session, you will be paired with another person. However, no participant will ever know the identity of the person with whom he or she is paired.
Decision Tasks
In each pair, one person will have the role of A, and the other will have the role of B. The amount of money you earn depends on the decisions made in your pair.
On the designated decision sheet, each person A will indicate whether he or she wishes to choose IN or OUT. If A chooses OUT, A and B each receive $5. We will collect these sheets after the choices have been indicated. Next, each person B will indicate whether he or she wishes to choose ROLL or DON'T ROLL (a die). Note that B will not know whether A has chosen IN or OUT; however, since B's decision will only make a difference when A has chosen IN, we ask B's to presume (for the purpose of making this decision) that A has chosen IN.
If Prior to the decision by A concerning IN or OUT, B has an option to send a message to A. Each B receives a blank sheet, on which a message can be written, if desired. We will allow time as needed for people to write messages, then these will be collected. Please print clearly if you are B and you wish to send a message to A. In these messages, no one is allowed to identify him or herself by name or number or gender or appearance. (The experimenter will monitor the messages. Violations, as determined by the experimenter, will result in B receiving only the $5 show-up fee, and the paired A receiving the average amount received by other A's.) Other than these restrictions, B may say anything that he or she wishes in this message. If B does not wish to not send a message, B should simply write an "X" in the space provided.
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Payoff Procedures
Each of you will receive a "code." The code will be written on your response form. The purpose of this code is --(so that the experimenters can insure that any message sent by B is received by the paired A. The code also allows the experimenters)--to insure that your payoff is based on your action and the action of the person with whom you are paired while maintaining that no participant will ever know the identity of the person with whom he or she is paired The code you receive will also be on a "key." After the experiment is completed, you will be able to receive your cash payment in a sealed envelope from a locked mailbox, located in another room here in the lab. The envelopes will be identical on the outside, so that no one, including the experimenter, will ever know the decision --(, message, )--or payoff of any participant. To protect your anonymity, you should place the coded key in your pocket once you receive it. After you have collected your payoff envelope, there will be a container into which everyone will drop their keys.
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The code you receive will also be on a "key." After the experiment is completed, each person will be called by name to collect their money. You will be able to receive your cash payment from the experimenter by privately showing your key to the experimenter so the experimenter knows how much money you earned. At this point your earnings will be recorded beside your name on the sign-in sheet you already completed. The experimenter will cut this page along the dashed line and only the bottom portion will be sent to A, if you choose to send a message. Place an "X" in the provided space if you do not wish so send a message to A.
You may print a message to your paired A below if you wish.
APPENDIX 2 Coder Instructions and Subject Messages
a/b in the Code column denotes that the three coders wee split and that two coded the messages as a and 1 coded the message as b. In the table with the messages from Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) , an * denotes that a majority of our coders evaluated the message differently than did CD.
Coder Instructions
Purpose: To study how communication affects the play of the game.
Game: Refer to the attached instructions for the experiment.
Coding Rules:
(1) The unit of observation is a single message.
(2) If a message contains the relevant category of content, enter the appropriate category code.
"0" a blank message "1" a promise or statement of intention of the action the message's sender will take (The senders actions are limited to Roll and Don't Roll)
"2" a message that is not blank, but does not contain a promise or statement of intention of the action the messenger's sender will take.
(3) You should independently code all messages. Do not discuss with anyone about which statements should fall into which categories.
(4) Your job is to capture the content of the message as sent rather than why it was sent or what effect it had. Think of yourself as a "coding machine."
You will be paid $20 for coding all messages. Thank you. It's much more likely that I'll roll a 2-6 and thus get more money than if we don't roll or choose out. I promise that I won't cheat you and that I'll choose to roll. J 33 Roll Out 2 2 Tee hee, this is kinda Twilight Zone -ism; Why not "go for it", eh? I hope you have a lovely evening as well.
Messages in Our Double-Blind Condition
